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Religious litigation in the modern era at the Supreme Court level falls into two 
separate regimes that delineate specific trends emanating f'iom and acting upon religious 
policy. Each regime contains its own set of ideas, interests, and institutions that 
characterize the nature and extent of religious freedom under the law. The first regime 
began with the incorporation of the First Amendment's religion clauses and represents a 
period of stability and equilibrium among the Court, Congress, and the involved interest 
groups. However, the Court's ruling in Empioymenr Division v. Smith (1990) destroyed 
that equilibrium and marked the beginning of a new regime characterized by uncertainty 
and complexity. Within that second regime, the Court and Congress are locked in a 
battle over policy-making authority, while interest groups that were former rivals now 
have joined together for the promotion of tree exercise. Today, the second regime is still 
in place and the complexity surrounding the free exercise debate continues to grow. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The full-scale entry of religious litigation into the sphere of the federal 
government is a relatively recent phenomenon. Taken as a whole, however, religious 
litigation in the modern era at the Supreme Court level falls into two separate regimes 
that delineate specific trends emanating from and acting upon religious policy. Each 
regime contains its own set of ideas, interests, and institutions that characterize the 
nature and extent of religious freedom under the law. By focusing on the decisions of 
the Supreme Court regarding the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, I will 
attempt to demonstrate how the ruling in Employment Division v. Smith (1990) shifted 
the Court, Congress, and the involved interest groups from a period of stability in the 
first regime to uncertainty and complexity in the second. As evidence of that shiA, I will 
provide information detailing the drastically increased role of Congress in religious 
policy-making during the second regime, as well as the profound change in allegiances 
experienced by many interest groups. 
This thesis follows the style and format of the American Political Science Review. 
FIRST REGIME 
The first religious regime has its beginnings in the turmoil of the New Deal. For 
several decades prior to the New Deal a conservative equilibrium of stability existed on 
the Court. However, that equilibrium was upset during the 1930s by President 
Roosevelt's liberal New Deal legislation and by his attempt to "pack" the Court with 
new justices. In 1938, Justice Harlan Stone attempted to restore a semblance of order to 
the Court by redirecting its focus away from judicial review of economic legislation, 
which had led to clashes with the president, in Footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene 
Products Company (1938). As a result, the Court achieved a new equilibrium in which 
an increasing number of cases dealing with personal rights and civil liberties were 
addressed. 
In 1940, the incorporation of the First Amendment's religious clauses into the 
realm of state law marked the beginning of the religious regime under the Free Exercise 
Clause. During that regime, the number of Supreme Court cases with free exercise 
claims grew rapidly in both number and complexity. In the civil rights era of the 1960s, 
the stability of the regime was further enhanced by a spirit of cooperation between the 
Court and Congress as they sought to "develop a set of fundamental principles that 
would permanently order US society" (Tushnet 2004, 520). For example, "sometimes 
Congress would push the ball forward, and the Court would approve, as in its holding 
that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to enact the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. " At other times, "Congress would actively seek out the Court's assistance, as 
when Congress directed the president to file a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of 
the poll tax" (Tushnet 2004, 520). 
This equilibrium continued throughout the remainder of the regime while the 
basic trend emanating &om the Court was to generally re&ain from restricting any 
religious sect's observances or practices so long as the public welfare was preserved. At 
the same time, religious interest groups and lobbyists began to form and filed amicus 
curiae briefs, sponsored litigation, and argued on behalf of litigants in many of the 
regime's major cases. These groups for the most part remained committed to their own 
ideologies and rarely cooperated on cases with rival groups. Most importantly, though, 
this regime represents the first extended period of stability since the New Deal where the 
relations between Congress, the Court, and the interested groups rested in a state of 
equilibrium. 
Increasing Litigation 
The origins of the first regime reside in Justice Harlan Stone's historic footnote 4 
where the Court tumed its focus from economic activism and began a "more searching 
judicial inquiry" into statutes that discriminated against "discrete and insular minorities" 
(United States v. Carolene Products 1938). Stone's footnote also implicitly endorsed 
Justice Holmes' doctrine of Preferred Freedoms in Lochner v. New York (1905) which 
states that the freedoms of the First Amendment deserve more judicial protection than 
others because they are of fundamental importance in a &ee society (Pritchett 1992, 
664). In terms of the Court's ability to make effective change, the footnote "provided a 
theoretical basis for future judicial activism in defense of powerless minorities" (Alfange 
1992, 307). With the footnote's ideas as its new focal point, the Court began handing 
down a number of decisions during the 1940s aimed at creating legal protection for the 
religious rights of niinorities. Thus, the first religious regime was born. Free exercise 
litigation grew substantially in both size and scope, beginning quietly with cases brought 
by smaller sects in the 1940s and 1950s and eventually growing increasingly complex in 
the following decades. 
The first regime begins with Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) where the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment were incorporated into the realm of the states. This 
incorporation enabled litigants to bring suit against state and local laws that burdened or 
inhibited religious observances, and as a result litigation against targeting such laws 
made its way onto the Court's docket in unprecedented numbers. 
The vast majority of the 1940s cases involved the rights of Jehovah's Witnesses 
within mainstream society, trom selling religious tracts on street corners without a 
license (Murdock v. Pennsylvania 1943) to forcing schoolchildren to recite the pledge of 
allegiance during the school day (Mtnersville School District v. Board of Education 
1940). On the whole, the litigation of this decade allowed greater freedoms for the 
Jehovah's Witnesses — and consequently other churches and faiths — than had ever been 
permitted before on a national level. However, free exercise was not given free reign as 
laws with neunal applications and valid state objectives were upheld in cases such as 
Jones v, Opelika (1942) and Prince v. Massachusetts (1944). 
The 1950s continued the same trends of the 1940s. Most cases involved the free 
exercise rights of Jehovah's Witnesses, while several neutrally applicable laws that 
inevitably put minor burdens on religious freedom were upheld by the Court. However, 
the 1950s also saw the entry of other churches into the free exercise debate. Kunz v. 
New York (1951) was brought by a Baptist minister and Kedro+v. Saint Nicholas 
Cathedral (1952) involved a question of control over ecclesiastical authority posed by 
the Russian Orthodox Church. 
The cases of the 1960s marked a break from the previous two decades in several 
aspects. First, the number of cases brought by Jehovah's Wimesses decreased 
drastically. More cases were brought by a nuinber of different churches and religions 
that had never before sponsored litigation at the Court, such as Orthodox Jews and 
Seventh Day Adventists. Second, the Vietnam War brought conscientious objectors into 
the free exercise debate for the first time in United States v. Seeger (1965). Third, the 
Court began upholding Sunday "blue laws" on economic grounds against two challenges 
by Orthodox Jews in Braunfeld v. Brown (1961) and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super 
Market (1961). Finally, in one of the most important decisions of the regime, Sherbert 
v, Verner (1963), the Court ruled in favor of a Seventh Day Adventist who was denied 
unemployment benefits because she would not take an available job that required her to 
work on Saturdays in contradicfion to her faith. This case set a precedent in 
unemployment claims cases and would serve as the point of departure for the second 
regime in 1990. 
Like the previous decade, the 1970s saw an increase in the number of diverse 
churches and religions litigating at the Court, For example, Cruz v. Beto (1972) 
involved a Buddhist inmate suing for relief against a Texas prison that had denied him 
the opportunity to practice his religion. In addition, three more conscientious objector 
decisions were handed down, each one validating the constitutionality of conscientious 
objector clause itself. Finally, another case continued the exemption for religious 
practices that was the premise behind Verner. In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) the Court 
upheld an exemption from compulsory state education up to age sixteen for the Amish 
people, who believed that secular education would devalue their religion. 
By the 1980s, the Court began to tighten the reigns on the breadth of religious 
free exercise in unusual circumstances, and as justification it cited overwhelming 
governmental interest in areas ranging Rom the maintenance of the federal tax system to 
prison security. The decisions in United States v. Lee (1982) and Bowen v. Ray (1986) 
were based on the principle that the laws at issue placed only incidental burdens on 
religious beliefs. Furthermore, those burdens were subordinate to the government's 
interest in preserving federal programs that affected the entire nation. Similarly, 
Goidman v. Weinberger (1986), O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987), and Lyng v. 
¹rthwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988) were all decided in favor of 
the prevailing governmental interests of military obedience and authority, prison 
security, and land use. However, at the same time the Court also made significant 
advances in expanding freedom of religious practices associated with workers' rights by 
expanding upon the precedent set by Verner. In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana 
Employment Security Division (1981) Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of 
Florida (1987), and Frasee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security (1989) the 
Court upheld the right to receive unemployment benefits of workers who had tumed 
down job opportunities that conflicted with their religious beliefs. Such was the state of 
the law created by the Court regarding the Free Exercise Clause prior to the 1990s. 
Employment Division of the Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith 
(1990), however, redirected the Court's philosophy and triggered a shift in regimes. 
Formation of Interest Groups 
In Free Exercise litigation no clear delineation exits between interest groups 
according to which particular issues will divide them. This is most likely due to several 
factors, including the lack of the one ditnensional argument that is present in 
Establishment Clause cases (the argument is litnited to support for governmental 
accommodation or separation between church and state), the complexity of most Free 
Exercise Clause claims, and the common overlap between Free Exercise and other First 
Amendment issues (i. e. free speech and association). As a result, I will examine the 
groups involved in Establishment Clause litigation on both the separationist and 
accomodationist sides and track their history through both regimes in order to 
demonsu'ate the remarkable shift in allegiances that occurred in the second regime. 
In his 1994 article, Kobylka cites a long history of both separationist and 
accomodationist litigation work done by a host of different organizations. On the 
separationist side, the major actors include the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
the American Jewish Congress (AJC), the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith 
(ADBB), and the Americans United (AU). Beginning with the ACLU's amicus curiae 
brief in support of the appellants in Everson v. Board of Education (1947), these groups 
strongly supported separationist claims by submitting amicus briefs and sponsoring 
litigation (Kobylka 1994, 111-118). Although two of the major groups listed, the AJC 
and the ADBB, spring from a mainstream Jewish perspective, separationist groups are 
not limited to any religion, church, or denomination. As the "nation's oldest mainstream 
civil liberties group", the ACLU approaches the Establishment Clause from a viewpoint 
of secular humanism that functions as the middle ground between its historic roots in 
Jeffersonian separationism and its branch of militant atheism (Weber and Jones 1994, 
10; Sorauf 1976, 32-33). In contrast, the AU represents a mix of conservative, 
traditionalist, and fundamentalist Protestant perspectives that are unified by an 
underlying fear of Roman Catholic societal power (Sorauf 1976, 33). Adding to its 
diversity is the fact that the majority of its contributions come froin Baptists, Christian 
Scientists, Seventh-day Adventists, and even Jews (Kobylka 1994, 115). 
On the other side of the Establishment Clause, the accommodationists groups 
began to form and organize later than the separationists. According to Frank Sorauf 
(1976, 184-190), before 1970 support for accommodation was limited to three groups, 
the United States Catholic Conference (USCC), the Citizens for Educational Freedom 
(CEF), and the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA). 
After the rise of the Religious Right and an increase in awareness and acceptance of 
conservatism in the 1970s, a host of new groups formed and turned their attention 
towards litigation, including the Christian Legal Society (CLS), the National Association 
of Evangelicals (NAE), Pat Robertson's National Legal Foundation, and the Catholic 
League for Religious and Civil Rights (Kobylka 1994, 116; O' Connor and Epstein 1983, 
487). The emergence of new accommodationist groups caused splits among the 
religions themselves. The formation of the COLPA caused a rifi in the Jewish litigation 
community that had formerly been entirely separationist. The Protestants fractionalized 
on an even greater scale as the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs and the 
Seventh Day Adventists sided with the separationists and the Christian Legal Society 
and the National Association of Evangelicals began work as accommodationists 
(Kobylka 1994, 116-117). 
Despite such fissures, these groups essentially stayed within the parameters of 
their original positions on religion cases before the Court during the 1970s. A change 
came in the 1980s and early 1990s as splits within the separationist camp on church-state 
cases occurred when traditional separationist stalwarts started to argue 
accommodationist positions against other separationist organizations (Kobylka 1994, 
118-119). On the whole, though, the first regime was a time of relative stability among 
the competing interest groups after the 1970 rise of the accommodationists. 
Supreme Court Trends 
At the opening of the first regime, the Supreme Court was under the command of 
Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes until his retirement in 1941. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone 
then took over the Chief Justice's Chair until his sudden death in 1946. As the author of 
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United States v. Caralene Products Company's (1938) famous footnote four, Chief 
Justice Stone's redirection of the Court towards greater attention to laws targeted at 
minorities marked the theoretical beginnings of the first regime. Succeeding him was 
Fred Vinson, who as Chief Justice attempted to avoid ov~g precedents and 
disliked making decisions with far-reaching effects. 
In direct opposition to Vinson's retiring manner was Chief Justice Earl Warren, 
whose renowned liberal Court dominated a large portion of the first regime from 1953- 
1969 (Goldman 2003). During that time, the Warren Court handed down more liberal 
decisions on civil liberties than had ever been seen before, creating equal rights for 
blacks and enforcing the separafion between church and state on Establishment Clause 
issues, among others (Wasby 1976, Rohde and Spaeth 1976). On the Free Exercise 
Clause, the Warren Court made a landmark ruling in 1963 with the Sherbert decision. 
After Warren, the Court underwent a significant transition away from liberalism 
with the election of Richard Nixon and his subsequent Court appointments, including the 
new Chief Justice Warren Burger, who served Irom 1963 until his retirement in 1986. 
Although under Burger the Court began a return toward the conservatism of the pre- 
Warren Court, it nonetheless upheld religious exemptions for cases similar to Sherbert 
(Wasby 1976, Spaeth 1979). Thus, a strong precedent for upholding other such 
exemptions, specifically in unemployment cases, was created in the years leading up to 
1990. 
The ideological trends of the Court majorities led by the Chief Jusfices 
throughout the first regime vary &om right to left, especially between the Warren and 
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Burger courts. However, by tracing Court decisions &om the issuance of Sherbcrr in 
1963 to those of its progeny, including Thomas in 1981, Hobbie in 1987, and Frazee in 
1989, one can see that the same liberal ruling occurred once within the Warren Court 
and three times in the conservative Courts of Burger and Rehnquist. With history or 
precedent and not ideology shaping this case trend, the Court was primed to make a 
similar decision in Emp/oymenr Division v. Smith, despite the differences in Smith's facts 
from those of the previous unemployment cases. But when the expected decision did not 
occur, the religious interest groups took notice, and thus the second religious regime was 
born. 
SECOND REGIME 
The change in regime occurred in 1990 when the Court made a dramatic 
adjustment in its conttolling idea over the nature of religious exercise by breaking from 
the prevailing hands-off approach towards religious observances and turning towards a 
more restricted view where religious rituals are required to conform to neutrally 
applicable laws, That change in direction greatly disrupted the equilibrium of the 
previous regime in two major ways. First, religious interest groups that had been former 
rivals on Establishment Clause cases now joined together with civil liberties groups 
under a massive coalition promoting free exercise. The inclusion of civil liberties 
groups and their concern for free speech in addition to free exercise issues, however, 
complicated the goal of the coalition by adding a second dimension to the one 
dimensional Establishment Clause issue with which the religious groups had been 
concerned. Second, the coalition's lobbying efforts in Congress spurred the legislature 
to create a bill that greatly expanded Congress' authority over religious policy-making 
and overruled the Court's 1990 decision. As a result, Congress emerged as a rival to the 
Court and the two institutions proceeded to compete for control over religious policy 
throughout the regime. This loss of equilibrium demonsnates the increased complexity 
and unwieldiness that characterize the free exercise debate within the second regime. 
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Litigation as Catalyst 
The facts of Employment Division of the Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith (1990) did not appear drastically difierent from those present in 
Sherbert and its progeny. However, unlike the litigants in previous Free Exercise 
unemployment cases, Al Smith had not quit his job or been fired because of purely 
religious beliefs. He had been dismissed &om his employer, a private drug rehabilitation 
firm, on charges of misconduct because he and the other appellant, Galen Black, had 
ingested peyote, an hallucinogenic drug used for sacramental purposes during a Native 
American Church ceremony (Epps 2004, 482-483). 
After moving through the state appeals process, the Oregon State Supreme Court 
found that Smith and Black's use of the peyote violated Oregon's controlled substance 
law, but that such a prohibition against peyote with its religious function violated the 
appellants' First Amendment rights. Had Oregon's ruling been affirmed by the US 
Supreme Court, it would have fallen directly in line with Sherbert. In view of that 
precedent there was an expectation for the Court to make that affirmation. Even during 
oral arguments none of the questions from the Justices implied that the Sherbert standard 
would not be used (Oral Argument 1989). 
However, with a 6:3 majority led by Justice Scalia, the Court reversed Oregon's 
ruling, stating that the Free Exercise Clause did not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to follow a religiously neutral and generally applicable law that incidentally 
placed a burden upon religious freedom. Furtherinore, the Court distinguished this 
ruling &om previous rulings made under the Sherbert precedent by arguing that the 
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"compelling governmental interest" test is only applicable in cases where the 
government has assessed an individual's eligibility for unemployment compensation 
(Employment Division v. Smith 1990). In cases like Smith that involved an "across-the- 
board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct" such a test could not be 
applied, for to do so would provide grounds to ignore other laws that are not supported 
by a compelling governmental interest. And as a last recourse, the Court even refused to 
limit such exemptions from generally applicable laws to practices that were central to an 
individual's belief system because such a limitation would force the Court to make 
impermissible judgments on the veracity and intricacies of an individual's beliefs 
(Employment Division v. Smith 1990), 
In 1993 the Court chose to apply its newly-created Smith precedent to a town 
upset over the practices of Santeria believers. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Ine. v. 
City of Hialeah (1993), the city government created a set of laws designed to prevent the 
ongoing animal sacrifices done by members of the Santeria religion. In its ruling, the 
Court applied Smith 's reasoning that a religiously neutral and generally applicable law 
does not need a compelling governmental interest to be valid under the Free Exercise 
Clause. However, the Court found the laws to not be neutral or general and 
consequently they were subject to strict scrutiny where the government is required to 
present a compelling interest for the laws and show that they were narrowly tailored to 
meet its stated purposes. The respondents failed to meet these requirements, and thus 
the laws were invalidated. 
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In 1997, the Court heard the much anticipated case of City of Boerne v. F/ores 
(1997), which challenged the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) that was passed by Congress in 1993 to overrule Smith. In another 6:3 ruling, 
the Court determined that the RFRA was a constitutionally impermissible extension of 
Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section Five 
empowered Congress to enforce the Constitutional guarantees that no State shall 
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" through "appropriate 
legislation. " 
However, according to prior Court rulings, this power to enforce is only 
preventative and remedial (South Carolina v. Katzenbach 1966). According to the 
majority in Boerne, by passing the RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to such a degree as to substantially alter the meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause and proscribe state action that the First and the Fourteenth Amendments 
do not prohibit. Furthermore, the Court claimed that the law served to disrupt the 
balance between federal and state governments and intruded into the states' traditional 
areas of control over the health and welfare of their citizens. Thus, the Court invalidated 
the RFRA and consequently denied Congress's attempt to overrule Smith and take 
control of the free exercise policy-making power. 
The Boerne outcome was a surprise to many based upon the makeup of the 
Court. Since the last addition to the natural Court in 1994, there appeared to be an 
accommodationist majority consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, 
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Thomas, and usually O' Connor and Kennedy (Epstein et al. 1996, 380; Ackerman, 
Jones, and Jennings 2003, 3). Such a majority should in theory have found the closer 
relationship between the government and religion created by the RFRA within the 
parameters of the Constitution. But even though containing six Reagan and Bush 
appointees, the Court shocked Con~ss by limiting legislative enforcement power and 
by not following the election returns that had placed a conservative majority in both 
Houses (Khan 1999, 193). Clearly, the Court saw Boerne as more of a threat to their 
institutional power of judicial review and as Congressional encroaclunent into their 
sphere of influence rather than as a partisan issue. Indeed, even the dissents of Justices 
O' Connor, Breyer, and Souter assumed the validity of the majority's treatment of 
Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment by focusing on their disagreement 
with the Smith outcome (Tushnet 2004, 520). 
The last free exercise case did not contain the same history making elements as 
Boerne. In Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton 
(2002), a case reminiscent of those from the 1940s and 1950s, a Jehovah's Witness 
group brought suit against a city for passing an ordinance requiring a permit for any 
canvasser who wished to go door to door in support of any cause. Due in part to its own 
history concerning the rights of Jehovah's Witnesses, the Court invalidated the permit 
law and chose not to apply the general applicability standard of Smith because of the 
breadth of speech the law covered, including religious proselytizing, anonymous 
political speech, and the distribution of handbills. Furthermore, the Court found that the 
permit law was not tailored narrowly enough to meet village's stated interests of 
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protecting the citizens' privacy and preventing canvassers &om defrauding and hanning 
residents. 
Without question, Smith set the tone for the rest of the free exercise cases in the 
remainder of the decade and the early part of the next. In the cases of Lukumi Babalu 
and 8'archtower Bible the first question asked by the justices was whether or not to 
apply the Smith ruling. With the law of general applicability provision applied to 
Lukumi Babalu, this case serves as Smith's first progeny and thus extends the legitimacy 
of the decision with the high potential for its application to more cases in the future. 
Yet, despite Smith's reapplication in the 1990s, the change in law that it ushered in 
disrupted the equilibrium among the religious interest groups and between the Court and 
Congress, 
Coalescence of Interest Groups 
Although several prominent religious interest groups had temporarily defected 
from the separationist to the accommodationist camp in the 1980s, the greatest 
conversion in past alliances was still to come. Religious leaders reacted with outrage to 
the Smith decision, and as a result, over seventy interest groups, including civil 
libertarians and major separationists and acconunodationists from many different faiths, 
joined together to create the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion (Epps 2004, 498- 
499). According to its amicus curiae brief in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), the 
Coalition on behalf of its members is "united by the conviction that the protection of 
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religious liberty is an essential element of a democratic society" (" Brief' 1995). A list 
of the Coalition's members at the time of Boerne can be found in the Appendix. 
Between 1990 and 1993, the Coalition drafted legislation for the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act and through its lobbying efforts helped to achieve the Act's 
passage. In 1997 the constitutionality of that Act was challenged in Boerne, and the 
Coalition filed an amicus curiae brief in favor of the respondents. When the Act was 
struck down, the Coalition continued its efforts to pass legislation similar to the RFRA 
that was acceptable to the Court. Despite two failed bills and a loss of membership due 
to politics and concerns about the possibility of religious Ireedoms trumping civil 
liberties, the Coalition finally succeeded in passing the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). Although RLUIPA does not have 
nearly the scope as did the RFRA, the Coalition nevertheless sees it as a victory in the 
battle for religious Ireedom, 
More importantly, the creation of the Coalition for Free Exercise of Religion is 
one of the defining aspects of the second regime. Although the separatist groups had 
begun to advocate positions from the accommodationist viewpoint during the 1980s, 
never before had so many groups come together to work for a common goal. Nor had 
such an extensive bill like the RFRA been passed in large part by the efforts of any type 
of religious interest group. In addition, despite a loss of membership after the RFRA 
was created, the Coalition achieved remarkable stability that enabled it to live on past the 
RFRA and present its amicus curiae brief in Boerne as well as draft legislation and lobby 
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for the passage of the Religious Liberty Protection Acts (RLPA) in 1998 - 2000 and the 
RLUIPA in 2000. 
Yet, the formation of the Coalition also signals an increase in the complexity of 
the religious freedom environment in the second regime. Among the religious groups 
present in the Coalition are civil liberties groups that do not include religious litigation 
as one of their primary goals. The reason that these groups initially joined the Coalition 
is due to the free speech issues frequently embedded within free exercises cases. As in 
the Jehovah's Witnesses cases during the 1940s, the right of religious advocates to 
practice their religion feely oAen intersects squarely with their right to speak freely. 
Without the ability to speak about their religion to passersby on the street, these 
individuals cannot fully practice their beliefs. Recognizing the dependence of 1'ree 
exercise on free speech in many situations, the religious interest groups welcomed the 
civil liberties proponents into Coalition. 
However, their inclusion and their resulting differences of opinion on the 
primacy of exemptions for religious believers created divisions among the Coalition 
members during the drafting of the two RLPA's from 1998 through 2000. The great fear 
among many of them was that if legislation such as the RLPA did pass and withstand the 
Court's review, the interests of churches and other religious groups might supersede 
anti-discrimination statutes as well as federal, state, and local tax and building 
regulations (American Atheists 2000a). The end result is that the instability created by 
the Smith decision forced these interest groups from diverse backgrounds and competing 
ideologies to align themselves into what ultimately amounted to a "coalition of 
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convenience. " At the same time, the existence of such a coalition adds to the instability 
of religious policy-making by complicating the issues surrounding the creation of f'ree 
exercise legislation, as seen in the struggle for the RLPA. 
Congress v. the Court 
The change in regime brought with it a change in the relationship between the 
Court and Congress over religious policy. Prior to 1990, Congress had remained 
separate from the religious issue, addressing it superficially in the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 with guidelines on providing federal funding to 
parochial schools. Thus for the entirety of the first regime the legislature offered no 
impediment to the Court's ability to set the boundaries on religious exercise. Once the 
Smith decision spurred a policy shift, the relationship between the two institutions 
developed into a struggle for control over policy-making power. At the heart of that 
struggle lies the question of who determines what the Constitution actually means. Mark 
Tushnet describes the point of contention accurately: "Justice Kennedy says [in Boerne] 
that RFRA alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause; this phrasing assumes that the 
Court's decision in Smith determined that meaning. He says that Congress changed the 
right to free exercise of religion; this phrasing assumes that the Court's decision in Smirh 
is unalterable except by the Court itself (or by the arduous process of constitutional 
amendment)" (2004, 521). 
As a result, the contention between Congress and the Court developed into one of 
competing legitimacies, where each institution had a vested interest in preserving and 
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asserting its power over the other. Reverting to the origins of judicial review, the Court 
saw its institutional prerogative as including "the province and duty . . . to say what the 
law is, " while Congress viewed its role as that of a coequal branch endowed with the 
will of the people to write the law (Marbury v. Madison 1803). Within this framework 
of opposing roles inspired by Smith, the Court and Congress engaged in a pattern of 
action where the Court issued a ruling, Congress responded with a law to override the 
Court's decision, and the Court would then overrule Congress's new law. This pattern 
fust appeared in the chain of events from Smith to the RFRA to Boerne, and it is set to 
appear again with Boerne, the RLUIPA, and eventually a case that would invalidate 
RLUIPA. 
The history of Congress's struggle begins after Smith was handed down by the 
Court in April of 1990. Immediately, members of Congress began work on a bill to 
protect once and for all the exercise of religious observances from interference by the 
Supreme Court and to protect citizens from another possible Smith-style usurpation of 
their constitutional rights. The result of their efforts was the 1993 Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) which: 
"[prohibited] any agency, department, or official of the United States or any State 
(the government) from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that the 
government may burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates 
that application of the burden to the person: (1) furthers a compelling 
22 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of fiuthering that 
compelling governmental interest. " (Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993) 
The text of the RFRA was designed to overturn Smith by destroying its precedent 
that made incidental burdens on religion permissible under laws of general applicability. 
It also attempted to solidify the pervious line of reasoning begun in Sherbert by 
requiring that any burden on religion be legitimized by a compelling governmental 
interest. But the greatest victory of the RFRA in the eyes of religion advocates was its 
creation of a seemingly separate and insular position for religion that general laws of 
society could not touch. The bill was extremely popular in Congress, especially so with 
the Democrats who controlled both houses. Sponsored by Representative Charles 
Schumer (D-NY) the bill passed the House by voice vote with no opposition and with 
170 cosponsors (73'/o of whom were Democrats). It passed 97-3 in the Senate with only 
two of the chamber's fifty-six Democrats opposed (" Bill Summary, H. R. 1308"). Yet, 
as mentioned earlier, the Boerne decision of 1997 overruled the RFRA and sent free 
exercise proponents back to the Congressional drawing board. 
In 1999, several years after the Republicans gained control of Congress, 
Representative Charles Canady (R-FL) presented the first bill aimed at piecing together 
the broken RFRA. The major portion of his bill, a Republican piece of legislation 
entitled the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999 (RLPA), prohibited 
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"a government (defined as a State, an entity created under State authority, the 
United States, an instrumentality or official of the United States, or any person 
acting under color of State or Federal law) (rom substantially burdening a 
person's religious exercise: (I) in a govenunent-operated program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance; or (2) in any case in which the burden 
affects or in which removal of the burden would affect, international or interstate 
commerce or commerce with Indian tribes. It allows a substannal burden if the 
government demonstrates that it is the least restrictive means of furthering a 
compelling governmental interest" (RLPA). 
The bill also forbade a state from discriminating against religious assemblies or 
institutions when imposing a land use regulation and from burdening any religious belief 
in any manner. Furthermore, the RLPA amended the RFRA by ending its applicability 
to the States and applying its precepts to the federal government only. It also added an 
additional plank to the definition of the "exercise of religion" so that it now included 
"any exercise of religion. . . including: (I) the use, building, or converting of real property 
for religious exercise; and (2) any conduct protected as a religious exercise under the 
First Amendment to the Constitution" (RLPA). 
Overall, the language of the bill recommended strongly that the Act be 
interpreted in favor of broad protections for religious exercise. The bill contained thirty- 
nine cosponsors, twenty-nine of whom where Republican, and it passed the House with a 
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strong majority of 306 — 118. However, the RLPA stalled indefinitely in the Senate and 
eventually died in the Judiciary Committee (" Bill Summary, H. R. 1691"). 
The failure of RLPA to pass the Senate caused many religious supporters to ask 
how a bill based upon the RFRA, which was eagerly approved by Congress, could not 
succeed this time around. According to the American Atheists, RLPA's inability to 
succeed was due to a combination of three factors. 
First, there was dissension in the ranks over the exact wording of the bill itself. 
Some religious conservatives felt that the current form of the bill could extend federal 
authority past what RFRA had allowed. Others withdrew their support after the House 
Subcommittee on the Constitution removed one of the bill's provisions that relied on the 
Commerce Clause of the Constituuon. According to Canady, the Committee's 
Chairman, the removal was necessary because it "presented an insurmountable obstacle 
to the movement of this bill" (Byrd 1998). 
Second, opposition that was not present in 1993 developed against the bill as 
civil rights groups, neighborhood and environmental coalitions, and even medical and 
child welfare groups argued that its focus on religion could trump neutral civil liberties 
statutes. 
Finally, the Coalition for Free Exercise began losing members over RLPA in 
1998 due to "practical and ideological reasons, " including the Concerned Women for 
America, the Traditional Values Coalition, the Christian Action Network, and the Home 
School Legal Defense Fund in 1998, and the Anti-Defamation League, the National 
Council of Churches, and the Baptist Joint Committee in 1999 (American Atheists 1998; 
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Byrd 1998). Although the Coalition remained intact and retained the membership of 
several of its prominent civil liberties groups such as the ACLU and the People for the 
American Way, the ACLU still felt forced to admit in August of 1999 that "some courts 
may turn RLPA's shield for religious exercise into a sword against civil rights. " 
(Bernstein 1999). 
However, the 1999 RLPA failure did not deter other members of Congress fiom 
attempting to push through religious bills again. In February of 2000, Senator Omn 
Hatch, a Republican from Utah, inttoduced the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 2000. 
The bill was a shortened version of the RLPA of 1999, including only the first section 
that prohibited the government &om substantially burdening a person's religious 
exercise in government programs that were federally funded or where that burden 
affected interstate commerce. Yet, despite Senator Hatch's efforts at paring away the 
parts of the 1999 RLPA that may have hindered its acceptance in the Senate, the same 
concerns that plagued the 1999 bill were still present and his bill failed to leave the 
Senate calendar (" Bill Summary, S. 2081). 
By the latter part of 2000, though, Senator Hatch succeeded in making the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) a public law. 
Like both the RLPA's, the RLUIPA was a smaller, more specific version of the RFRA 
that prohibited the government &om imposing or implementing a land use regulation 
that imposed a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, or &om imposing 
a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an 
institution, even if both cases of burdens result from laws of general applicability. 
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However, the government could sustain such burdens if it demonstrated that they "(1) 
[are] in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) [are] the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest" (RLUIPA). 
Although the bill's focus on prohibition of the burdening of religious land usages 
appears inconsequential within the scheme of expanding free exercise rights, it succeeds 
in eliminating the very issue that gave rise to Boerne and the overruling of the RFRA. 
RLUIPA's success was ensured when the ACLU endorsed it as a compromise between 
RLPA supporters and the concerns of civil liberties groups that free exercise privileges 
may trump other rights (" Hatch Rushing" ). The bill passed with unanimous consent in 
the Senate on July 27, 2000, it passed again with unanimous consent in the House that 
same night, and by September 22 President Clinton signed it into law (" Bill Summary, 
S. 2869). 
An explanation for the passage of RFRA and RLUIPA could be political 
partisanship. At the time of the Smith decision, a conservative majority controlled the 
Court, led primarily by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist. According to data 
complied by Epstein and Knight on the years 1986-1995, that majority translated their 
conservatism into votes against increased civil liberties. Based on that information, the 
decision to withhold an exemption from Smith for religious peyote use is not 
unexpected. Boerne's invalidation of the RFRA in 1997 is also in keeping with the 
Court's conservative trend, especially with the addition to the Court of ultra- 
conservative Clarence Thomas in 1993. Meanwhile, in the early 1990s Congress was 
controlled by a Democratic majority, placing Congress well to the left of the Court on 
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the political spectrum. The passage of the RFRA in early November of 1993 can be seen 
as the Democratic Congress's retaliation against a conservative Court's shift in judicial 
precedent. 
However, the Republican Congressional takeover in 1993 severely undercuts this 
hypothesis. The new conservative majority should not have attempted to overturn a 
conservative Court decision, nor should it have attempted to reconstruct Democratic 
legislation in the form of the RLPA's and RLUIPA. The fact that Congress's majority 
did act out of conservative character demonstrates that as a whole it was pursuing its 
institutional interest in preserving policy-making power against Supreme Court 
challenges, regardless of the ideology of its members. Such disregard for ideology is 
also present in the religious interest groups' Coalition and once again reveals the lack of 
stability within the second regime's religious policy environment. 
Since 1997, the Court has been silent in its debate with Congress over religious 
policy setting superiority. However, with RLUIPA finally in place as the "son of 
RFRA" the opportunity exists for litigation contesting its constitutionality to eventually 
make its way to the Court. As of now, three Circuit Courts of Appeals, including the 
sixth, seventh, and ninth, have heard appeals with RLUIPA claims and held in each that 
RLUIPA is constitutional. The Fourth Circuit has also heard a RLUIPA appeal and is 
alone in its denial of RLUIPA's constitutionality. These cases have been appealed to the 
Supreme Court, and with disagreement among four Circuits many consider RLUIPA as 
ripe for review. 
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If the High Court places a RLUIPA case on its docket and invalidates the law as 
it did the RFRA, the Court will have continued the pattern of contention between it and 
Congress that began with Smith and undoubtedly the debate for policy-making 
supremacy will persist. However, a decision to uphold RLUIPA would be a significant 
departure &om Smith's rule enshrining laws of general applicability Rom religion, 
although such departures are not unusual in the Court's history. Also, the Court would 
in effect be ceding a portion of its authority on religious policy to Congress, which may 
in turn satisfy some of the demands of the Coalition for Free Exercise. Nonetheless, 
these are merely predictions and can be confirmed only if the Court makes the pivotal 
decision to review a RLUIPA case. What is certain is that as long as the contention 
persists between the Court and Congress, a reemergence of the previous regime's 
stability is unlikely. 
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CONCLUSION 
Overall, the second regime represents a definite shift away from the first regime 
as major changes have occurred in the ideas promulgated by the Supreme Court, the 
ability of concerned religious groups to have their interests heard, and the relationship of 
the institutions involved in religious policy-making. The equilibrium that existed prior 
to 1990 among all the involved actors and institutions collapsed. In its place emerged a 
highly complex environment where interest groups that were traditionally divided 
against one another have broken down barriers and joined together, despite major 
historical, institutional, and doctrinal differences among them. Conversely, the 
congenial relationship that existed between the Court and Congress disintegrated when, 
provoked by the Court's decision in Smith, Congress reawakened its long dormant 
Section Five powers located in the Fourteenth Amendment and applied them to the Free 
Exercise Clause. From this environment, two major goals have developed. The first is, 
obviously, the advancement of greater freedoms for religious observances. Both 
Congress and the remaining members of the Coalition continue to work towards this 
end, which can only be achieved with the Court's approval. The second goal is the 
attainment of dominance by either the Court or Congress over religious policy-making 
power and ultimately constitutional interpretation. There is no definite explanation as to 
why Congress has chosen to wage its interpretational war with the Court on the grounds 
of the First Amendment. The answer may lie in the pressure applied by the Coalition in 
the first years after Smith, or it may be found in the reinstatement of Republican 
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majorities in both Houses in 1993. Whatever the explanation, in its struggle against the 
Court, Congress has taken Justice Holmes' 1905 Preferred Freedom Doctrine and 
singled out the freedom of religion to be the preferred freedom, the first among equals. 
But no matter the tactics used or the grounds chosen, as long as the Court continues to 
have the last word on Congressional legislation, the battle for supremacy will continue. 
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APPENDIX 
MEMBERS OF THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
COALITION AT THE TIME OF BOERNE V. FLORES 
Agudath Israel 
American Associauon of Christian Schools 
American Baptist Churches USA 
American Civil Liberties Union 
American Conferences on Religious Movements 
American Ethical Union 
American Humanist Association 
American Jewish Committee 
American Jewish Congress 
American Muslim Council 
Americans for Democratic Action 
Americans for Religious Liberty 
Americans United 
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith 
Association on American Indian Affairs 
Association of Christian Schools International 
Baptist Joint Committee on Public A@airs 
Central Conference of American Rabbis 
Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) 
Christian Legal Society 
Christian Life Comtnission, Southern Baptist Convention 
Christian Science Cotnmittee on Publication 
Church of the Brethren 
Church of Scientology International 
Coalihon for Christian Colleges and Universities Coalitions for America 
Concerned Women for America 
Council of Jewish Federations 
Council on Religious Freedom 
Council on Spiritual Practices 




and Society and 
Friends Committee on National Legislation 
General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists 
Guru Gobind Singh Foundation 
Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of America 
Home School Defense Association 
International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists 
International Institute for Religious Freedom 
The Jewish Reconstructionist Federation 
Mennonite Central Committee US 
Muslim Prison Foundation 
Mystic Temple of Light, Inc. 
National Association of Evangelicals 
National Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund 
National Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty 
National Council of Churches of Christ 
National Council of Jewish Wotnen 
National Council on Islatnic Affairs 
National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs 
National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council 
National Sikh Center 
Native American Church of North America 
Native American Rights Fund 
North American Council for Muslim Women 
People for the American Way 
Peyote Way Church of God 
Clifton Kirkpatrick, as stated clerk of the General Assembly of 
Church 
Rabbinical Council of America 
Sacred Sites Inter-faith Alliance 
Soka-Gakkai International, USA 
Traditional Values Coalition 
Union of American Hebrew Congregations 
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregation of America 
Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations 
United Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society 
The United Methodist Church and the General Board of Church 
the General Council on Finance and Administration 
United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism 
Wisconsin Judicare 
Women of Reform Judaism, Federation of Temple Sisterhoods 
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